Stratfor: Special Report - July 18, 2006
Special Report: Situation Review
By George Friedman
We have been following developments in the Israeli-Hezbollah
conflict closely for several days. At this writing, the air-rocket
war continues to rage, but the Israeli ground offensive that we
would have expected by now has not yet been launched. There is some
speculation that it will not be launched -- that a combination of
air operations and a diplomatic process will be sufficient, from
Israel's point of view, to negate the need for a ground attack.
While the various processes grind their way along, it is time to
review the situation.
The first point to bear in mind is that the crisis did not truly
begin with the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah. The
kidnappings presented a serious problem for Israel, but could not,
by themselves, define the geopolitical issue. That definition came
when Hezbollah rockets struck Haifa, Israel's third-largest city,
on July 13. There were also claims coming from Hezbollah, and
confirmed by Israeli officials, that Hezbollah had missiles
available that could reach Tel Aviv. Israel's population is
concentrated in the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor and in the Tel
Aviv-Haifa corridor. In effect, Hezbollah had attained the ability
to strike at the Israeli heartland. Hezbollah has been hitting the
northern part of this heartland, as well as pounding Israel's
northern frontier.
The capture of two soldiers posed a symbolic challenge to Israel,
but the rocket attacks posed a direct geopolitical threat. Israel
had substantial room for maneuver regarding the captured troops.
The threat to the heartland, however, could not be evaded. To the
extent possible, Israel had to stop the missile attacks. As
important, it also had to eliminate Hezbollah's ability to resume
such attacks. The Israelis can tolerate these strikes for a certain
period of time, so long as the outcome is a final cessation. What
was not an option for Israel was to engage in temporary solutions
that would allow Hezbollah to attack the heartland regularly, at
its discretion. Hezbollah has posed a problem that Israel cannot
choose to ignore.
Hezbollah's reasons for doing so at this time are not altogether
clear. It certainly has to do with the crisis in Palestinian
politics: Hezbollah wants to stake a place for itself as Palestine
redefines itself. It also has to do with the vacuum created by the
withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and freedom of action for
Hezbollah that previously has been denied it by the Syrians.
Finally, it is clear that Iranian and Shiite politics within the
wider Islamic world have made Hezbollah action at this time
attractive for the group's Iranian patrons.
However complex Hezbollah's motives might be, the consequences of
its actions are crystal-clear: From the Israeli perspective, it is
imperative that the rocket attacks must be shut down.
Israel's Imperfect Options
Israel has three tools at its disposal.
One is diplomacy. There is a general consensus, even among many in
Lebanon and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, that Hezbollah's
actions have been unreasonable and undesirable. It would not be too
difficult, we would think, to create a circumstance in which the
two Israeli soldiers are released, a cease-fire is declared and an
international monitoring team inserted into the region. That is
what the French, for example, have proposed, and what is being
discussed now.
The problem with this option, from the Israeli point of view, is
that it puts off a solution to the deeper problem posed by
Hezbollah to a later day -- one that might not be so advantageous
for Israel. Israel has a built-in distrust of international
peacekeeping operations -- dating back to May 1967, when the United
Nations, without consulting Israel, withdrew peacekeepers from
Sinai at the behest of the Egyptians. This cultural bias against
peacekeepers is reinforced by the fact that Hezbollah could rearm
itself behind the peacekeeping shield. Whether the peacekeepers
would conduct operations to prevent this -- in effect, carrying out
counterinsurgency operations in Lebanon in support of Israel's
goals -- is doubtful in the extreme. Instead, the presence of a
peacekeeping force might facilitate a more substantial Hezbollah
capability down the road. This is, at least, how the Israelis think
of it, and their position therefore has been consistent: The
outcome of this conflict must be the destruction of Hezbollah, or
at least its offensive capability, for an extended period of time.
That leads to Israel's other two options, both of which would be
carried out with military force.
The first step has been the Israeli air campaign. All modern
military operations by advanced powers begin with air campaigns.
Their purpose is to prepare the battlefield for land attack and, in
some cases, to force a political settlement. In Kosovo, for
example, air attacks alone were sufficient to convince the Yugoslav
government to concede its control over Kosovo. In the case of
Desert Storm, the air campaign came in preparation for a ground
attack.
Air forces around the world like to make extravagant claims as to
what air power can do; the Israeli air force is no exception.
However, while an air campaign can severely hamper Hezbollah --
particularly by attacking launch sites and storage facilities, and
generally making launches difficult -- the likelihood that air
power can, by itself, eliminate the threat is unlikely.
To reiterate a key point, the nature of the threat is continual
attacks on Israel's geopolitical heartland. Now, it is possible
that Israeli air operations could force some sort of political
settlement, but again, as with the diplomatic option, it is
difficult to conceive of a political settlement that guarantees
what Israel wants. Even a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern
Lebanon, coupled with occupation of the area by the Lebanese army,
does not solve the problem. This solution assumes that the Lebanese
army has the will and ability to prevent Hezbollah's return. For
this to work, the Lebanese army would have to agree to dismantle
Hezbollah's infrastructure, and Hezbollah would have to agree to
let them do so -- and Israel would have to place its faith in both
Hezbollah and the Lebanese army and government. It is difficult to
imagine a situation in which the Israelis can reach a satisfactory
political settlement. The air campaign as a political tool suffers
from the same defect as the diplomatic track: It is of value only
if Israel is prepared to accept a solution that does not guarantee
a complete end to the threat posed by Hezbollah -- and potentially
might leave the Israelis in a worse position, militarily, down the
road.
There is an additional political fact and problem. Obviously, any
threat to a heartland generates a unique political response. In
Israel, the Olmert government is heir to Ariel Sharon's quest for
an imposed political settlement on the Palestinians. This is a
strategy opposed from the right, by Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud,
who argues that any settlement that leaves military options in the
hands of the Palestinians is unsustainable. The Hezbollah issue is
the Palestinian issue on steroids. If Olmert were to agree to any
settlement that does not include dismantling Hezbollah's
capabilities or that relies on a third party to police that
dismantling, Netanyahu would attack hard -- and we suspect that
enough of Olmert's coalition would defect to force a political
crisis in Israel.
There has been no attack from Netanyahu, however. This can be
partly explained by the Israeli tradition that politics stops when
war begins. But we suspect this goes deeper than that. Olmert is
keeping Netanyahu informed as to his intentions and Netanyahu is
content with the course being pursued, making it clear in public
that his support depends on the government faithfully pursuing that
course -- meaning the destruction of Hezbollah as an organized
entity. Olmert does not have much room for maneuver on this, nor is
it apparent that he wants any. The goal is the destruction of
Hezbollah; anything less would not work, on any level, for Israel.
The Logic for a Ground Offensive
From this, we must conclude that the air campaign comes in
preparation for what is Israel's third option: a ground offensive.
If Israel's goal is the destruction of Hezbollah's ability to
strike the Israeli heartland for an extended period of time, the
only way to hope to achieve this is from the ground. Those
conducting air operations can see only what can be seen from the
air. And even if they can hit whatever they see, eliminating the
threat requires a ground presence. Therefore, we continue to
believe that logic and evidence argue for an Israeli invasion of
southern Lebanon -- and that any possible diplomatic or political
resolution, however tempting, ultimately could not satisfy Israel's
security requirements.
When we say invasion, we do not mean occupation. Israel has had its
fill of counterinsurgency operations in Lebanon. This would be a
raid in force. A large force would push into Lebanon, with two
missions: the destruction of Hezbollah as an army and the location
and destruction of all heavy weaponry. This solution would not be
permanent, but it would achieve two ends. First, it would mean that
for Hezbollah or a successor organization to regroup would take
years. Second, it would leave no third party shielding Hezbollah
while it regrouped. This strategy gives Israel what it wants now
and options in the future.
Three more Israeli battalions were mobilized today. The United
States, which certainly knows Israel's intentions, is now
extracting U.S. citizens from Beirut. Israeli aircraft are working
over Hezbollah positions in the Bekaa Valley. The United States,
Israel's patron, is clearly in favor of the destruction of
Hezbollah and there is no broad-based opposition to an Israeli
offensive internationally. It is a window of opportunity that
Israel will not pass up. The very thing that makes diplomatic
solutions possible also makes invasion, for the Israelis,
attractive.
Our analysis therefore runs as follows:
1. Only an invasion on the ground can provide Israel with the
solution it wants to the threat Hezbollah has posed.
2. A diplomatic or political settlement not only cannot guarantee
this outcome, but it would make later Israeli responses to
Hezbollah even more difficult. Israel has more room for maneuver
internationally now than it will have later.
3. The internal politics of Israel will make it very difficult for
Olmert to come out of this with a less-than-definitive outcome.
4. Israel will seek to deal with Hezbollah without undertaking
counterinsurgency operations in the long term. This means attack,
sterilization of the threat, and withdrawal.
There has been much speculation about diplomatic solutions, the
possibility that there will not be an invasion, and so on. But when
we ignore the rhetoric and look at the chessboard, it is difficult
to see how this conflict ends without some action on the ground.
When we examine the behavior of the Israelis, they are taking the
steps that would be needed for an invasion. Obviously we could be
wrong, and clearly the invasion has not come at the earliest
possible moment, as we had predicted. Nevertheless, when we step
through the logic, we keep coming out with the same answer:
invasion.
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